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Corruption and civic space: Contextual factors influencing EITI compliance

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ABSTRACT

Market and government failures led to the formation of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) as an alternative governance structure. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is one of these. The impact assessments of EITI yield mixed results. The variation in impact may be attributed to the difference in compliance with the EITI Standard. The authors implemented an ordered logit regression analysis to analyze the relationship between contextual factors and countries' level of EITI compliance. The authors used the 2013–2015 World Governance Indicators (WGIs) to represent the state of governance in member countries. The EITI International Secretariat's quarterly assessment of countries' compliance with the EITI safeguard requirements was used as a proxy for EITI compliance. The authors found statistically significant positive relationship between perception of political freedom and compliance with the safeguard requirements. This finding supports the importance of civic space in making MSIs effective. The authors also found that states that are perceived to be more corrupt, ineffective and has weak rule of law are more likely to comply with the EITI requirements. The findings on freedom and corruption are consistent across models. Countries maybe complying with EITI to improve their reputation and benefit from incentives a compliance status in EITI bring.

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1. Introduction

The Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is one of the global voluntary standards that aims to increase transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. It facilitates access to information and creates a platform for different stakeholders to interact and hold the government and the private sector accountable. It also hopes to improve the management of natural resources, reduce corruption, and mitigate conflict (Haufler, 2010). It was launched in 2002 as a response to concerns on the resource curse and corruption in the extractives sector (EITI International Secretariat, n.d.).

The EITI is an example of the emerging concept of meta-governance which is defined as “an indirect form of governing that is exercised by influencing various processes of self-governance.” It aims at “enhancing coordinated governance in a fragmented

[regulatory] system based on a high degree of autonomy for a plurality of self-governing networks and institutions” (Sørensen, 2006, p. 100). Derks and Glasbergen (2014) explained that mainstreaming of voluntary sustainability standards increases its influence in the public sector and in return affects public and environmental policy objectives.

Assessment of the impact of EITI is mixed. The 2016 EITI progress report cites cases where EITI was able to contribute in strengthening government systems, guiding policy reforms, identifying beneficial owners of extractive activities, transparency in commodity trading, improving access to data, among others (EITI International Secretariat, 2016a). Several studies independently validated these claims. On the other hand, there are instances when EITI did not contribute to reforms and changes (Sequeira et al., 2016; Shaxson, 2009; Sovacool et al., 2016; Sovacool and Andrews, 2015).

The initiative presupposes that the goals of the EITI can be met by adhering to certain minimum requirements known as the EITI Standard. The varied impacts of EITI may be attributed to the difference in the level of implementation and compliance with the EITI Standard. This study identifies contextual factors that determine the compliance of countries to the EITI requirements.

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These factors may help explain what motivates country countries to meet the Standard. It may also help in defining the technical assistance that can be provided to countries that are implementing the EITI. Millions of dollars are used to support EITI implementation. For fiscal year 2015, the EITI-Multi-Donor Trust Fund provided more than USD 9.3 million to 37 implementing countries (World Bank, 2015). The international management of the EITI spent around USD 5 million in 2015. The support came from private sector, supporting countries and international development agencies (EITI International Secretariat, 2016a). Individual implementing countries also allocate resources from their budget to implement EITI in their countries. Firms and non-government organizations both at the national and international level allocate resources to participate and support EITI implementation. Physical and financial resources can be strategically and efficiently allocated by identifying factors that are associated with the successful implementation of the EITI requirements.

Several countries are currently undergoing validation on their level of compliance with the 2016 Standard. In between validations, the international secretariat regularly makes country by country assessment of the implementation progress. This information is confidential. With permission from the international secretariat, we recoded the quarterly assessments into an annual compliance score of countries. The compliance score is ordinal indicating the state of implementation of EITI in the country. It represents the compliance of countries with the safeguard requirements of EITI and not entirely on compliance with the EITI Standard. This, however, is the best proxy available in measuring compliance with the Standard since validation has not been completed for all countries. The compliance score is analyzed with the six World Governance Indicators (WGIs). The indicators capture public perception of civic space and political freedom, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory capacity, rule of law and control of corruption in a country (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The WGIs are used as proxy measures for the state of governance in the country. Natural resources rent as a percentage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) is also included to see whether the size of the rent affects compliance of countries (World Bank, 2016).

The compliance score of 41 EITI implementing countries together with the WGIs and the size of the natural resources rent as a proportion of GDP for the period 2013–2015 formed the panel data. Ordered logit model, controlling for country and time fixed effects, is used to analyze the data.

EITI is a governance structure and a tool for reform. As a governance structure, it is anchored on the principle that the government, business and civil society are on equal footing in implementing EITI. In this regard, we hypothesize that stronger civic space and political rights increases the likelihood that countries will be able to comply with the EITI requirements. As a tool for reform, EITI can be used as a signaling tool to improve the reputation of countries perceived to be corrupt and ineffective. It can also be used as an incentive or condition for countries to improve their state of affairs. Therefore, we hypothesize that lower scores on government effectiveness, regulatory capacity, rule of law and control of corruption increase the likelihood that countries will comply with the EITI Standard.

This study has some limitations. The compliance score is based on the International Secretariat's assessments of the implementation progress of countries rather than on the Standard's validation procedure. However, this is the only data currently available that measures compliance of countries with the EITI requirements. The WGIs are also measures of perception rather than the actual political contexts of the countries. However, perceptions can also represent the actual experiences of the respondents. It can also shape public policies. We also have a small sample size which

limited the inclusion of other independent variables. We believe that these limitations do not diminish the relevance of the study.

2. Background: the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

The EITI started with a set of principles that focused on increase transparency of payments and revenues in the extractive sector. The principles were adopted in London in 2003. After the pilot implementation of EITI, the principles had evolved into six EITI criteria which set some rules in implementing EITI. The criteria included regular publication of payments by companies to government and revenues received by governments from companies. The criteria evolved into EITI rules which were adopted in the 2009 and 2011 Conferences.

In 2013, the EITI adopted a standard which aims to set clearer rules, and produce more useful, relevant and accurate reports. It also wants to encourage countries to go beyond the minimum compliance with the EITI Standard (Moberg, 2013).

Under the EITI, countries are either "candidate" or "compliant." To be a candidate country, the government must issue an unequivocal public statement of its intention to implement the EITI. It is also required to appoint a senior individual to lead its implementation. The government must also work with civil society and companies and establish a multi-stakeholder group (MSG) that will oversee the implementation of the EITI and produce a detailed work plan (EITI International Secretariat, 2015).

To become a compliant country, the candidate country must be able to satisfactorily meet the EITI Standard which includes effective oversight by the multi-stakeholder group and timely publication of the EITI reports. The reports must include contextual information and full disclosure of extractive industry revenues and payments to the government. The report must also be produced through a credible assurance process applying international standards and must be comprehensible, actively promoted, publicly accessible, and must contribute to public debate. The EITI MSG is also required to monitor the impact of the EITI implementation on public policy (EITI International Secretariat, 2015).

The Standard indicates how the EITI has evolved from being an initiative to being "a global rules-based transparency standard" that promotes multi-stakeholder approach to governance (EITI International Secretariat, n.d.). In the 2016 Conference, the 2013 Standard was amended to include provisions to enable mainstreamed transparency, disclosure of beneficial ownership by 2020, improved validation procedures, reporting of progress of implementation of the recommendations from EITI reports, open data policy and policy on per diems of Multi-stakeholder Group (MSG) representatives (Rogan, 2016). As of June 2017, EITI is being implemented in 52 countries with 31 countries compliant with the 2011 rules (EITI International Secretariat, 2017b, 2016a).

We posit that the varying impacts of EITI implementation in different countries can be explained by the level of compliance with the EITI Standard which is then influenced by factors related to the context of the country where it is being implemented. EITI serves two functions. It is a meta-governance structure that operates at the national and international levels. It creates an opportunity for the different actors to dialogue and work together to improve natural resource governance. At the same time, EITI sets a global standard which tries to influence and shape the policies on natural resource governance at the national level. The effectiveness of the EITI as a meta-governance structure and the ability of countries to meet the Standard are evaluated through the validation process of the EITI. Fifteen countries have started the validation process in 2016. The board has made a decision on

Timor-Leste, Peru, Nigeria, Mongolia and Azerbaijan. Eighteen countries are to commence validation in 2017 (EITI International Secretariat, 2016b).

3. Conceptual framework and review of literature

There are two important elements that need to be examined in determining the factors that influence countries' compliance with EITI. One is the governance structure of EITI and the other is the motivation of countries to comply with EITI.

Because of the inability of the market and government to address certain issues leading to market and government failures, new approaches were developed to address these gaps. The creation of legitimate space for interest groups to participate in policy review and formulation made it easier to make governments and the private sector accountable. Known as meta-governance institutions, "multi-stakeholder initiatives" (MSIs) are efforts aimed at addressing regulatory gaps and negative impacts of corporate practices. These MSIs rely on negotiated standards and more defined governance structures, ideally based on principles such as transparency, accountability, and equitable stakeholder participation (Jerbi, 2012). The EITI is an example of an MSI. The model creates pressure for reform externally by setting an international standard and internally by encouraging countries to implement the EITI Standard domestically.

Koechlin and Calland (2009) described MSIs as meta-governance institutions where key actors are incorporated in a process to seek comprehensive approach and solutions to individual and common problems of the sectors involved. They ascribed the appropriateness of MSIs to "the global and interconnected nature of new problems, the slow and winding pace and often inappropriate instruments of global negotiation processes, and the interdependencies between the various stakeholders and their actions." Market and government failures were identified as reasons for setting up MSIs, emphasizing the importance of the business and civic organizations in such formations (Koechlin and Calland, 2009, p. 86). Koechlin and Calland also identified effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability as important elements to successful outcomes of MSIs.

The involvement of public sector actors is essential for meta-governance to enhance legitimacy and public interest orientation (Derckx and Glasbergen, 2014). One factor identified as critical in initiating and sustaining reform outcomes is a strong and consistent commitment from the government and involvement of political institutions. Legal framework, incentive structures, and political will which may come in forms of state support, having a champion from within government, willingness to institutionalize the reforms are necessary for the initiatives' success (Gaventa and McGee, 2013; Mejía Acosta, 2013; Robinson, 2007; Sturesson and Zobel, 2015).

One determinant of success of MSIs is the ability of the different actors to freely participate, influence the process and advocate their own interests (Gaventa and McGee, 2013; Mejía Acosta, 2013). It should serve as a free market of interests with very little constraints for key actors to participate. Gaventa and McGee (2013) concluded that these initiatives will not be successful in non-democratic settings. They also concluded that capable citizens are necessary for transparency to work. This means capacity to analyze and process newly available information, active media, prior social-mobilization experience, coalitions and intermediaries who can translate and communicate information. They also emphasized the need for the citizens to be involved in policy formulation and monitoring.

Civic space (the set of conditions that determine the extent to which all members of society, both as individuals and in informal or organized groups, are able to freely, effectively and without

discrimination exercise their basic civil right) is essential to the healthy functioning and development of any society, and is considered a precondition for accountable governance and social justice (Malena, 2015). Gaventa and Barrett (2012) found positive effects of citizen participation on democratic and developmental outcomes. On the contrary, Speer (2012) claims there is positive but limited evidence showing a link between participatory governance mechanisms and public policy benefits, including increased accountability, higher government responsiveness, and better public services. She found that enabling and motivating citizens and public officials to make participatory governance arrangements work as effective accountability mechanisms is a challenging enterprise in most developing countries.

Evaluating the theory of MSIs in the EITI context, Aaronson (2008) stated that empowerment of non-government organizations (NGOs) in monitoring government efforts is one of the important aspects in effectively implementing EITI. Ölcner, 2009 also pointed out that strong civil society and free and independent media in implementing countries are indispensable for EITI's success. Sturesson and Zobel (2015) also identified the important role of civil society in sustaining the implementation. According to their study, the unsuccessful implementation of EITI in Uganda is because of the government's stricter control of NGO activities in the oil region and lack of government ownership and political will. Aaronson (2011) also pointed out that full participation of civil society and access to information are crucial to successfully implementing EITI. Sovacool et al. (2016) explained that one of the reasons why EITI implementation did not contribute to improvement in countries' governance and development outcomes is the absence of strong civil society actors in host countries. Other factors include the EITI's limited mandate, its voluntary nature, and resistance by key stakeholders. Mejía Acosta (2013) found that lack of stakeholder leadership, the exclusion of key social actors or pre-existing institutional constraints such as weak accountability and oversight institutions undermined the implementation of EITI. In the experience of Krygystan, domestic structural factors played an important role in the challenges in the implementation of the EITI process (Furstenberg, 2015).

MSI Integrity's guidance note on civil society participation on EITI emphasized the importance of "active, inclusive and robust civil society participation" in the success of EITI (Integrity, 2015, p. 2). An assessment report of the same group identified problems that undermine civil society participation in EITI. This includes involvement of government in the selection of CSO representatives, processes within the EITI MSG that may undermine civil society independence and effectiveness, and the lack of internal governance processes within the CSO constituency (MSI Integrity, 2015b).

In this regard, we view the compliance with the EITI requirements as a positive outcome of the implementation of the initiative in a country. Following the theoretical framework on MSIs and the literature review on EITI, strong civic space, participation of the business sector and government commitments are significant determinants of compliance with EITI.

We examine the different theories why countries comply with international standards to establish the link between the political and institutional contexts where EITI operates and the motivation of countries to implement and comply with the EITI requirements.

A State's adherence to rules is driven by the State's concern for its reputation. In international law, the dominant theory is that reputational concerns help ensure that states maintain their agreements. A State's reputation is viewed as a summary of its opponents' current beliefs about the State's compliance strategy or set of strategies in connection with various commitments. The higher its opponents' expectation about how reliably a state will

maintain its commitments, the better the state's reputation (Downs and Jones, 2002). Compliance occurs due to state concern about both reputational and direct sanctions triggered by violations of the law (Guzman, 2002).

According to Mitchell (2007) States join international treaties to promote their national interests. States conform to international agreements not because of the influence of the agreement but because it is in their interest to do so. High compliance is expected if agreements require little or no change in behavior or require behavioral changes that parties planned to make anyway. In addition, compliance with international agreements maybe a result of pressure from leader states for 'laggard' states to 're-level the playing field' by complying the same standards which is already established and implemented in the leader state. Therefore, he emphasized that compliance "reflects the short-term and self-interested behavior of the parties, defined narrowly and independently of the action of other states . . ." (Mitchell, 2007, p. 905).

Both the reputation theory and theory on self-interest relate to why countries comply with the EITI Standard. Self-interest, coercion, and legitimacy all appear to motivate States to implement and subsequently comply with the requirements. Self-interest may motivate participation to the extent that they expect to benefit materially. Some expect to receive development aid and other support after joining "because participation . . . may allow them to bolster their reputations for battling corruption and to signal a general willingness to reform their management of natural resources revenues" (Rose, 2015, p. 162). EITI membership is correlated with lower levels of income and higher levels of resource dependency, corruption, and FDI flows. The results imply that while industrialized countries join to set an example for developing states, many corrupt governments join as a gesture to appease foreign investors. These states employ "mock compliance" to adhere to western norms without necessarily changing actual practices (Öge, 2016).

Consistent with Mitchell's theory on leader and laggard states, states with no reputation for corruption or are not expecting aid appear to have recognized that their participation would enhance EITI's legitimacy (Mitchell, 2007). They demonstrate that revenue transparency norms are relevant and applicable in both developing and developed States. This induces participation from resource-rich, middle income countries (Rose, 2015).

This seems to also jibe with a theory under international law known as legitimacy theory which posits that states obey rules perceived to have "come into being in accordance with the right process." Four factors determine whether a state complies with international obligations: determinacy which refers to the clarity of the rule or norm; symbolic validation which refers to the presence of procedural practices or rituals that provide a rule with symbolic importance and legitimacy; coherence which refers to the connection between rational principles and the rule; and adherence which is the connection between the rule and those secondary rules used to interpret and apply the primary. Where these four factors are present, legitimacy theory predicts a strong pressure toward compliance, and where they are absent, it predicts a very limited impetus in that direction (Guzman, 2002, p. 1834).

States with poor corruption records would also be interested in joining EITI even if it invites scrutiny of their conduct and even if it can potentially diminish their ability to extract rents in the future. Compliance with international norms serves as reputational intermediaries. This creates a context in which governments are motivated to subscribe to a norm so as to build a reputation with other international actors and, in so doing, gain access to social and material benefits. The EITI sheds light on these processes. Once transparency has emerged as an international norm associated with good governance, EITI becomes an important tool for

reformers in government to signal their good intentions, helping them to motivate their peers to comply. International actors in turn seek to assist domestic reformers by rewarding the achievement of EITI objectives with more concrete benefits, including increased aid, so as to help them sustain domestic momentum (David-Barrett et al., 2015).

EU support for developing countries includes attempts to improve domestic resource mobilization. In Ghana, the General Budget Support conditionality addresses the transparent inclusion of oil revenues into the budget and calls for a Petroleum Revenue Management Act and an Extractive Industries Transparency Governance Framework (EU Directorate-General for External Policies, 2011).

In some cases, participation may be deemed coerced as when the implementation of EITI was explicitly required for debt relief in Liberia and Cameroon, and for development aid in Yemen (Rose, 2015). Canada's support for Senegal is anchored on among other things financial reforms which includes the production of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative reconciliation reports (Government of Canada, 2013).

The different theories on compliance of state to international agreements and standards suggest that an incentive to comply with the EITI Standard exist for corrupt and inefficient nations. The primary motivations are to improve their international reputation and access to possible material benefits that they may access due to compliance with the Standard. These benefits may come as incentives from leader countries which may use the Standard as conditionality to exert pressure to "laggard" countries to change behavior and level the playing field for the industries.

Given the theory and literature review on MSIs, and the theories and discussions on compliance, we suggest that countries that comply with EITI have strong civic space and political freedom but may have high incidence of corruption and ineffectiveness. Self-interests to improve reputation before the international community and benefit from possible incentives or mock-compliance are possible explanations for corrupt and ineffective governments' compliance with EITI.

4. Data description and methodology

The countries assessed in this study include EITI-implementing countries that joined EITI on or before 2013. Table A1 in the Appendix A down the 41 countries included in this study with the information on the year they joined.

The EITI Secretariat produces quarterly internal assessment reports on how the countries are progressing in terms of the implementation of the Standard. The assessment is based on the safeguard requirements of EITI which pertain to the quality of government, company and civil society engagement and timeliness of EITI reporting. The assessment reports guide the discussion of the International Board. The report presents the progress of each country using three progress markers:

Red – There are significant delays with implementation and the country is facing considerable challenges with meeting the EITI Requirements. The country is suspended or is at risk of being suspended.

Amber – The country is making progress but is facing some challenges with implementation.

Green – Implementation is on track. The country is not experiencing any particular difficulties with the EITI Requirements but further work may be necessary to increase impact and relevance of implementation.

For the purpose of this research, the three classifications were assigned a numerical score of one to three to come up with an ordinal measure reflecting the progress of each country in meeting the Standard through its safeguard requirements. The annual score

is the mode of the quarterly assessments during the given year. The score was used as the dependent variable in this study.

We use the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as explanatory variables to represent the context of EITI implementation in the country. The indicators have six broad dimension of governance based on different data sources capturing governance perceptions. The six indicators are organized under three broad areas of governance. The indicators are based on 31 data sources which include surveys of households and firms and expert assessments on the state of governance in the country. The values range from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher score indicating better governance (Kaufmann et al., 2010):

a. The process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced

Voice and Accountability – captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism – measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability, and/or politically/motivated violence, including terrorism.

b. The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies

Government Effectiveness – captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

Regulatory Quality – captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

c. The respect of citizens and the state of the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them

Rule of Law – captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Control of Corruption – captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.

Natural resources rent as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is also included in the model to capture the size of the extractive sector in country i at time t . The natural resources rent data was sourced from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (World Bank, 2016). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the model.

It can be seen that almost half of the countries implementing EITI are on track in terms of implementation. The mean scores of the WGIs also indicate the weak state of governance in most EITI countries. Natural resources rent as percentage of GDP is also decreasing from 2013 to 2015.

Table A2 in the Appendix A presents the correlation matrix across all variables. Owing to the high correlation between the WGIs and the small sample size, the indicators are grouped and included in the model separately. This resulted in eight ordered logit models.

The methodology used in analyzing the data is ordered logit model given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Dummy variables for time were included to control for time effects. Dummy variables for country were also included to have a fixed effects model and control for individual country characteristics that may bias the independent or dependent variables. Additionally, both lagged and contemporaneous independent variables were included in the model. This will allow us to see the lagged and instantaneous effects of the independent variables. The Stata command *-ologit* with robust standard errors was used to address heteroscedasticity.

5. Estimation results and discussion

We present the regression results of the eight models on the determinants of EITI compliance in Table 2. As indicated in the previous section, eight models were generated given all the possible combinations of the six WGIs that fall under three broad areas of governance. Each model used either one of the following indicators:

- Voice and Accountability or Political Stability
- Government Effectiveness or Regulatory Quality
- Rule of Law or Control of Corruption

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (n = 123).

Variables	2013	2014	2015
	n = 41	n = 41	n = 41
Compliance Score			
red-1(n)	10(24%)	7(17%)	7(17%)
amber-2(n)	11(27%)	15(37%)	16(39%)
green-3(n)	20(49%)	19(46%)	18(44%)
Voice and accountability M(SD)	−0.506(0.677)	−0.420(0.682)	−0.402(0.689)
[min-max]	[−1.513 to 1.771]	[−1.435 to 1.713]	[−1.513 to 1.702]
Political Stability M(SD)	−0.716(0.846)	−0.735(0.935)	−0.693(0.886)
[min-max]	[−2.504 to 1.330]	[−2.687 to 1.111]	[−2.632 to 1.148]
Government Effectiveness M(SD)	−0.737(0.612)	−0.739(0.646)	−0.732(0.641)
[min-max]	[−1.614 to 1.877]	[−1.867 to 1.810]	[−1.792 to 1.862]
Regulatory Quality M(SD)	−0.522(0.568)	−0.544(0.570)	−0.554(0.569)
[min-max]	[−1.333 to 1.664]	[−1.361 to 1.638]	[−1.440 to 1.634]
Rule of Law M(SD)	−0.810(0.612)	−0.718(0.595)	−0.720(0.601)
[min-max]	[−1.816 to 1.980]	[−1.728 to 2.045]	[−1.721 to 2.022]
Control of Corruption M(SD)	−0.734(0.591)	−0.724(0.592)	−0.682(0.592)
[min-max]	[−1.433 to 2.301]	[−1.551 to 2.227]	[−1.448 to 2.261]
Resource Rent M(SD)	19.036(26.373)	16.737(20.500)	11.112(9.714)
[min-max]	[0.736 to 166.210]	[0.729 to 126.435]	0 to 36.433

Table 2

Determinants of Compliance with EITI Safeguard Requirements.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Voice and Accountability (lagged)	17.602 (2.51)*	12.17 (1.76)	16.547 (2.75)**	11.814 (2.29)*				
Political Stability (lagged)					1.909 (1.00)	0.293 (0.20)	0.94 (0.57)	1.741 (1.21)
Government Effectiveness (lagged)		−0.792 (0.12)		−5.257 (0.86)	−3.731 (0.64)			−4.31 (0.76)
Regulatory Quality (lagged)	8.493 (0.81)		11.516 (1.73)			9.468 (1.20)	0.635 (0.04)	
Rule of Law (lagged)			−4.561 (1.27)	−7.314 (1.34)		−4.044 (0.97)		−7.603 (1.28)
Control of Corruption (lagged)	−6.215 (1.15)	−4.323 (0.70)			1.827 (0.36)		−2.557 (0.46)	
Resource Rent (lagged)	0.094 (0.34)	0.119 (0.29)	0.218 (0.91)	0.184 (0.53)	0.059 (0.20)	0.094 (0.39)	0.103 (0.38)	−0.004 (0.01)
Voice and Accountability	−1.746 (0.30)	−3.949 (0.54)	−9.089 (1.85)	−10.423 (1.82)				
Political Stability					−2.833 (1.17)	1.864 (1.28)	−0.431 (0.21)	−1.27 (0.73)
Government Effectiveness		−18.123 (2.22)*		−22.643 (3.31)**	−21.929 (2.19)*			−23.477 (3.78)**
Regulatory Quality	−2.162 (0.33)		−4.741 (0.91)			−3.346 (0.65)	−1.274 (0.15)	
Rule of Law			−14.872 (2.57)*	−12.909 (2.03)*		−13.428 (2.26)*		−10.8 (1.92)
Control of Corruption	−22.923 (4.38)**	−18.326 (3.47)**			−20.392 (4.32)**		−21.94 (4.06)**	
Resource Rent	−0.051 (0.56)	−0.081 (0.56)	−0.069 (0.85)	−0.093 (0.77)	−0.047 (0.47)	−0.017 (0.21)	−0.044 (0.55)	−0.021 (0.21)
2014 dummy	0.518 (0.55)	0.919 (0.57)	2.487 (2.35)*	2.405 (1.88)	0.388 (0.37)	1.563 (1.71)	0.55 (0.62)	1.015 (0.89)
2015 dummy	0.026 (0.02)	0.146 (0.11)	1.692 (1.28)	1.503 (1.31)	1.038 (0.89)	2.04 (1.65)	1.371 (1.06)	1.367 (1.18)
constant (cut1)	13.307 (0.77)	47.422 (2.59)**	15.37 (1.13)	70.592 (3.36)**	64.163 (3.26)**	17.398 (1.15)	34.494 (1.57)	68.218 (3.86)**
constant(cut2)	18.425 (1.06)	53.616 (2.77)**	19.433 (1.42)	75.905 (3.50)**	70.271 (3.35)**	21.216 (1.40)	39.13 (1.75)	73.301 (4.00)**
Wald chi2	4353.35	3984.07	4311.23	2903.88	3995.06	5173.55	4142.57	3408.28
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R ²	0.6406	0.6789	0.5625	0.6415	0.6717	0.5287	0.6025	0.6240
N	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123

z scores in parentheses * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

The lagged and contemporaneous natural resources rent as percentage of GDP was included in all the models.

The regression analysis produced some very interesting findings. While correlation is strong between the WGI, the indicators do not seem to be a perfect substitute of each other. In the case of the lagged values of Voice and Accountability indicator and Political Stability indicator, both showed positive directions but only Voice and Accountability indicator was statistically significant $p < 0.05$ in two models and significant at $p < 0.01$ in one model: (1) when it was analyzed with the Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption indicators; and (2) when analyzed with Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law indicators; and (3) when analyzed with Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law indicators. The positive significant findings for the lagged value of Voice and Accountability indicate that the effect of the perception of strong civic space and political rights does not have instantaneous effects in countries' compliance with the safeguard requirements of the EITI. This was also confirmed by the non-significance of the contemporaneous Voice and Accountability indicators in all the models. This result indicates that an increase in the Voice and Accountability indicator will increase the likelihood that a country will be able to successfully meet the EITI safeguard requirements in the succeeding year.

The contemporaneous Government Effectiveness indicator was also statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$ respectively, in all the models where it was included. The results indicate that a decrease in the perception of effective governance or good quality public services increases the likelihood that the country will meet the EITI safeguard requirements in the same year. Government Effectiveness indicator has no feedback time effect as indicated by the insignificance of its lagged variable in all the models where it was included. The contemporaneous Regulatory Quality indicator, while having the same directionality in terms of effect, was not statistically significant in any of the models where it was included.

Another contemporaneous variable that is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ is the Control of Corruption indicator. It is consistently significant in all the models where it was included as a determinant. The negative sign of the coefficient means that an increase in the perception of corruption in the country increases the likelihood that the country will meet the EITI safeguard requirements. The results also indicate that the effect is instantaneous given the non-significance of the lagged indicator. The indicator Rule of Law was more closely linked with Control of Corruption given the same directionality of the effect on the dependent variable. It was also consistently significant at $p < 0.05$ in three models. The result suggests that a decrease in the perception of confidence in police and courts, enforceability of

contracts, property rights and rules of society increases the likelihood of compliance with the EITI safeguard requirements.

All the other variables were not statistically significant. The Wald chi square of all the models are statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. The values of all the pseudo R^2 are in the range of 0.60 which indicates very good model fit.

The results of our regression analysis confirmed our hypothesis that compliance of countries with EITI is correlated with strong civic space and political freedom, perceived high levels of corruption and government ineffectiveness.

Table 3 presents the marginal effects of the significant independent variables in each model. The average marginal effect shows the average amount of change in the probability of countries meeting the EITI safeguards with a unit increase in the value of the indicators.

The results show that in models 1 and 3, a unit increase in the lagged value of Voice and Accountability indicator will increase the probability that a country will meet the safeguard requirements by 127 percentage points and 146 percentage points respectively. A unit increase in the lagged value of Voice and Accountability indicator will increase the probability that a country will meet the safeguard requirements by 89 percentage points under model 4.

A unit decrease in the contemporaneous Government Effectiveness indicator will increase the probability that a country will meet the safeguard requirements by 121 percentage points in model 2, 171 percentage points in model 4, 153 percentage points in model 5, and 190 percentage points in model 8.

In models 3, 4 and 6, a unit decrease in the contemporaneous Rule of Law indicator will increase the probability that a country will meet the safeguard requirements by 131 percentage points, 98 percentage points, and 129 percentage points respectively.

A unit decrease in the contemporaneous indicator of Control of Corruption will increase the probability that a country will meet the safeguard requirements by 165 percentage points in model 1, 122 percentage points in model 2, 142 percentage points in model 5 and 181 percentage points in model 7.

To validate the results of our analysis, we tested the model using alternative indicators for civic space and political rights, corruption, and government effectiveness and efficiency. We used the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which measures perception of corruption in the public sector, Freedom in the World Index (FWI) which we computed as the average of the political rights and civil liberties scores and Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) which takes into account rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency and open markets (Freedom House, 2016; The Heritage Foundation, 2017; Transparency International, 2016). The CPI assigns higher score to less corrupt countries. The values range from 0 to 100. The FWI uses a one-to-seven scale. One represents the highest degree of freedom and seven represents the lowest. IEF also uses the scale

of 0 to 100. Higher scores indicate greater economic freedom. The results of this model are consistent with some of our findings. FIW and IEF are both statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. Greater political rights, civil liberties and economic freedom increase the likelihood of compliance with the EITI safeguard requirements. We observed an instantaneous effect of political rights and civil liberties on countries' compliance. The indicator on economic freedom takes into account rule of law and regulatory efficiency. The result of this indicator contradicts our initial findings that perception of weak rule of law and regulatory inefficiency increases the likelihood of compliance with the EITI safeguard requirements. The indicator, however, also measures open markets which may explain the difference in findings. An increase in the perception of corruption increases the likelihood of compliance with the EITI safeguard requirements. However, CPI is not statistically significant. The result of the regression is in Table A3 of the Appendix A.

6. Conclusion

The EITI evolved from a set of principles to a rule-based Standard countries need to meet to be able to be designated as a compliant country. It also promotes a multi-stakeholder form of governance that is proposed to address what governments and markets fail to do. While the EITI remains voluntary, there are factors that may influence country's compliance with the EITI's requirements. This study treads on new ground as it attempts to analyze the determinants of EITI compliance using quantitative methodology. We examined the conditions that may influence compliance with the EITI on the assumption that an effective implementation of EITI may result in meaningful changes in implementing countries.

The results of the different models tested in this study are consistent with the theory that successful MSIs require strong and legitimate civic space. The statistically significant positive relationship between compliance with the EITI safeguard requirements and the lagged Voice and Accountability indicator showed that strong perception of freedom of expression and association in a country increases the likelihood of a country meeting the EITI requirements. It suggests the need for strong democratic space for EITI to thrive.

Another consistent finding in the different models suggests that high perceptions of corruption, weak rule of law and government ineffectiveness in the country increase the likelihood that it will comply and meet the EITI requirements. These findings are supported by the theories on compliance. Countries comply with international agreements to change their reputation. EITI serves as an incentive and opportunity for countries perceived to be corrupt and ineffective to change their reputation. Compliance with EITI signals the international community that a corrupt and ineffective country is doing something positive to address its situation. In addition, the findings also confirm that EITI has served as an

Table 3
Average Marginal Effects of the Determinants of Compliance with EITI Safeguard Requirements.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Voice and Accountability (lagged)	1.267 (-2.85)		1.458 (3.20)	0.894 (-2.67)				
Government Effectiveness		-1.210 (-2.52)		-1.713 (-4.08)	-1.531 (-2.36)			-1.897 (-4.38)
Rule of Law			-1.311 (-2.73)	-0.977 (-1.92)		-1.286 (-2.32)		
Control of Corruption	-1.651 (-4.99)	-1.223 (-3.21)			-1.423 (-5.25)		-1.812 (-3.93)	

z scores in parentheses.

effective requirement for leader countries to influence 'laggard' countries to change their behavior by using EITI as conditionality for grants and loans. The greater likelihood for countries that are perceived to be more corrupt and ineffective to comply with the EITI requirements may indicate intentions to change its reputation, or willingness to implement reforms. It may also indicate mock-compliance. Our findings on greater political freedom and civil rights, and corruption are consistent across different indicators.

Support must be provided in strengthening civic space and political freedom in countries, for EITI to be more effective as a governance structure and a standard for natural resource governance. Countries should also find the right motivation and incentives to comply with the Standard. Finding the right motivation and incentive may translate to stronger government commitment to support the implementation of EITI in a country.

We recognize the limitations of the study. The main determinants used in this study are perceptions-based measures of governance. It reflects perception and assessments of households, firms and experts from various organizations. This makes the indicators subjective. However, as noted by Kaufmann et al. (2010), there are very few alternatives to perception data. And when there are available fact-based data, there are substantial difference between what is in the law and the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, it is important to flag the limitations of perceptions data in terms of possible bias and in capturing relevant reality.

The dependent variable is also perception data based on the evaluation and monitoring of the International Secretariat of the performance of countries. It is based on the review of reports submitted by countries and discussions and coordination with the national EITIs. In addition, the dependent variable only captures compliance with the EITI safeguard or minimum requirements and not compliance with the EITI Standard. This may not capture the actual status of the country when it actually undergoes the validation process to determine if it is compliant with the EITI Standard. However, this is currently the only available data that can serve as proxy for countries' compliance with the EITI Standard. The EITI safeguard requirements also embody the minimum requirements to be able to comply with the EITI Standard.

Another limitation of the study is the size of the sample which limited the inclusion of other possible explanatory variables in the model. Despite these limitations, the study was able to present significant determinants of compliance with the EITI safeguard requirements. Future studies can focus on replicating this study using the outcomes of the EITI Standard validation procedure and identifying other factors that may enable compliance with the EITI Standard.

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Appendix A.

Table A1
List of EITI Countries.*

Country	Year joined
Afghanistan	2013
Albania	2013
Azerbaijan	2005
Burkina Faso	2009
Cameroon	2007
Central African Republic	2011
Chad	2007
Côte d' Ivoire	2008
Democratic Republic of Congo	2008
Ghana	2010
Guatemala	2013
Guinea	2007
Honduras	2013
Indonesia	2010
Iraq	2012
Kazakhstan	2013
Kyrgyz Republic	2011
Liberia	2009
Madagascar	2007
Mali	2007
Mauritania	2007
Mongolia	2007
Mozambique	2009
Niger	2007
Nigeria	2004
Norway	2007
Peru	2007
Republic of Congo	2007
Sao Tome & Principe	2012
Senegal	2013
Sierra Leone	2008
Solomon Islands	2012
Tajikistan	2013
Tanzania	2009
Philippines	2013
Timor Leste	2007
Togo	2010
Trinidad & Tobago	2011
Ukraine	2013
Yemen	2011
Zambia	2009

* As of the end of 2013; compliant on the 2011 EITI Rules.

Table A2
Correlation Matrix.

	Voice and Accountability (lagged)	Political Stability (lagged)	Government Effectiveness (lagged)	Regulatory Quality (lagged)	Rule of Law (lagged)	Control of Corruption (lagged)	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption
Voice and Accountability (lagged)	1.000	0.697	0.775	0.761	0.822	0.834	0.992	0.682	0.748	0.761	0.806	0.836
Political Stability (lagged)	0.697	1.000	0.614	0.557	0.704	0.655	0.684	0.963	0.618	0.578	0.704	0.670
Government Effectiveness (lagged)	0.775	0.614	1.000	0.910	0.900	0.827	0.753	0.591	0.981	0.922	0.901	0.824
Regulatory Quality (lagged)	0.761	0.557	0.910	1.000	0.848	0.786	0.743	0.548	0.896	0.989	0.851	0.780
Rule of Law (lagged)	0.822	0.704	0.900	0.848	1.000	0.919	0.806	0.688	0.889	0.854	0.987	0.919
Control of Corruption (lagged)	0.834	0.655	0.827	0.786	0.919	1.000	0.819	0.650	0.806	0.794	0.908	0.985
Voice and Accountability	0.992	0.684	0.753	0.743	0.806	0.819	1.000	0.675	0.730	0.742	0.798	0.827
Political Stability	0.682	0.963	0.591	0.548	0.688	0.650	0.675	1.000	0.607	0.573	0.696	0.671
Government Effectiveness	0.748	0.618	0.981	0.896	0.889	0.806	0.730	0.607	1.000	0.920	0.899	0.814
Regulatory Quality	0.761	0.578	0.922	0.989	0.854	0.794	0.742	0.573	0.920	1.000	0.861	0.791
Rule of Law	0.806	0.704	0.901	0.851	0.987	0.908	0.798	0.696	0.899	0.861	1.000	0.917
Control of Corruption	0.836	0.670	0.824	0.780	0.919	0.985	0.827	0.671	0.814	0.791	0.917	1.000

Table A3

Determinants of Compliance with EITI Safeguard Requirements (using different set of indicators).

Corruption Perception Index	-0.464 (1.18)
Freedom in the World (FIW)	-3.624 (2.50)*
FIW (lagged)	0.774 (0.54)
Economic freedom	0.759 (2.07)*
Resource Rent	-0.029 (0.35)
Resource Rent (lagged)	0.148 (0.63)
2014 dummy	0.674 (0.68)
2015 dummy	-0.241 (0.20)
constant (cut1)	14.661 (0.62)
constant (cut2)	18.365 (0.78)
Wald chi2	4356.49
Prob > chi2	0.00
Pseudo R ²	0.5454
N	114

Note: Country dummies are omitted in this table.

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